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Abstract—Cloud Computing has emerged as a model to process
large volumetric data. Though Cloud Computing is very popular,
cloud security could delay its adoption. Security of the cloud
must provide data confidentiality and protection of resources.
Such architecture seems to be vulnerable when confronted to
distributed attacks also known as large-scale coordinated attacks.
In this paper, we study the impact of large-scale coordinated
attacks on Cloud Computing and its current security solutions.
We experiment the open-source IDS Snort and a commercialized
firewall using distributed portscan. Our results show that these
security solutions are not designed to detect distributed attacks.
Indeed, an attacker who controls about 32 hosts can easily achieve
a distributed portscan without being detected.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing ; Security ; Firewall ; Intru-
sion Detection System ; Distributed attacks ; Portscan.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing is currently a popular model to process
large data set. This model provides several layers of services
according to the needs of customers. Most of Cloud Computing
customers use these services either to store conﬁdential data
or to employ powerful resources in order to process large data
set. This is why Cloud Computing security has to be reliable.
Security of a network is mainly provided by security devices
such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Firewalls. These
complementary devices can detect intrusions and block attacks
from or targeting the cloud. Actually, such devices are not
formerly designed to detect distributed attacks. These, also
known as large-scale coordinated attacks, could be led by
splitting attacks so that security devices do not detect intrusion
attempts.
In this paper, we study the impact of these attacks on
Cloud Computing. We propose an overview of security devices
possibly used in this context. Our work focuses on two devices,
the open-source IDS Snort and a commercialized ﬁrewall1.
We led experiments using distributed portscan with different
environments : various number of scanners or targets, several
TCP portscan techniques and two distribution methods. Results
indicate that these devices can easily be evaded when attacks are
well distributed. For example, depending on portscan techniques
and distribution methods, 32 or 64 scanners are enough to
achieve a distributed portscan without being detected.
1The company which manufactured the experimented ﬁrewall wanted to
remain anonymous.
Nowadays, such resources are easily available, through
botnets or after a worm outbreak or simply by renting servers
on a commercial cloud solution (like Amazon EC2). This is
why we are interested in detection of large-scale coordinated
attacks, one of the issues that delay Cloud Computing adoption.
The paper is structured as follow. First, Section II introduces
the background of this paper and presents current security
solutions. Then, Section III describes distributed portscan, the
large-scale coordinated attack used to experiment security solu-
tions. Section IV and V present respectively the experimental
protocol and results of experimentations. Finally, Section VI
concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Cloud computing
Lately, actors of domains like industry or research raise a
common difﬁculty : processing of large amount of data. Cloud
computing has emerged as a popular model to meet such needs.
Rimal et al. present Cloud Computing in [1] as the concept
that addresses the next evolutionary step of distributed comput-
ing. Also, they add that Cloud Computing deals with different
fundamentals like virtualization, scalability, interoperability,
quality of service and fail over mechanism. We deﬁne in the
following parts what is Cloud Computing and how it is secured.
1) Characteristics of the cloud: in [1], Rimal et al. deﬁne
Cloud Computing as a structure designed to provide services
to external users. These services let users concentrate on what
they want to deploy rather than how to deploy it. Services can
be classiﬁed into three main categories: software, platform and
infrastructure services.
Application service or Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) delivers
software over the internet, simplifying support and mainte-
nance. Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) facilitates deployment of
applications without the cost and complexity of buying and
managing the underlying hardware. Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) provides a platform virtualization environment along
with storage and networking.
Other characteristics about the cloud are virtualization
management, fault tolerance, load balancing, and security.
2) Security of the Cloud: in [1], Rimal et al. add that there
is a growing concern about security. Users store conﬁdential
information in these architectures, and in wrong hands, it could
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create a civil liability. This issue may delay Cloud Computing
adoption.
Main components of security structures are ﬁrewalls and
intrusion detection systems. Bellovin et al. describe ﬁrewalls
in [2] as components placed between two networks. All the
trafﬁc between these networks must pass through the ﬁrewall.
Also, ﬁrewalls ﬁlter authorized trafﬁc, deﬁned by local security
policies. Debar et al. outline in [3] that the main task of
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to monitor the usage of
systems and to detect insecure states. IDSs detect attempts and
active misuse by legitimate users or external parties to abuse
their privileges or exploit security vulnerabilities.
Though Cloud Computing relies on datacenter structures,
its security is not just about ﬁrewalls and intrusion detection
systems placed more or less randomly. Cloud Computing
security must be adaptable to dynamic architecture (users on
the cloud may change during an attack). Moreover, cloud users
may be malicious or an attacker could have the control of one of
several internal hosts. Cloud security must ensure applications
availability and data integrity. Finally, it must prevent DDoS,
worms spreading and such large-scale coordinated attacks (even
inside Cloud Computing).
Due to their location (at the border of the network), ﬁrewalls
would not be able to detect those attacks. Indeed, ﬁrewalls
would not see attacks inside the network. IDSs, well-placed in
the network, are likely to be components that detect coordinated
attacks. That is why our work focuses on IDSs. Our experiments
study current IDSs faced to large-scale coordinated attacks.
B. Intrusion detection system
Security management can be split in three main parts:
prevention, detection and correction. IDSs deal with detection
part.
In [4], Peddisetty sums up deﬁnitions of [5] and [6]. He
describes intrusion detection as the process of monitoring
events and analyzing them for sign of intrusions or attempts
to compromise the conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability or to
bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or network.
Peddisetty classiﬁes IDSs according to their location, detec-
tion method and response. Following sections present location
and detection method categories, which are interesting for our
study.
1) Location: The most common way to classify IDSs
is to group them by location. Network-based IDSs (NIDS)
operate intrusion detection directly on the network; they detect
attacks by capturing and analyzing network packets. Host-based
IDSs (HIDS) operate on information collected from within an
individual computer system. They analyze system logs and
critical system ﬁles to detect intrusion. Finally, Distributed-
IDSs (DIDS) [5][6] use several IDSs (whatever the location)
to correlate events from different places of the network.
2) Detection methods: Core engines in detecting malicious
activities are detection methods. They function automatically,
analyze the information they monitor and raise alarms whenever
they detect intrusion. Peddisetty sums up detection methods in
[4]. Most used techniques are Pattern Matching and Anomaly-
Based detection.
Pattern Matching (or Signature-Based Detection) consists in
scanning information and looking for known patterns into it.
Whenever the IDS has found a similarity, it raises an alarm.
Signature-Based Detection can detect known intrusions, so
the main weakness of this method is the need of a constant
update of the database containing known patterns (also called
signatures).
Anomaly-Based Detection adopts a simple approach : ignore
everything that is normal and raise an alarm if it deviates from
the normality. This kind of detection method can be effective
in detecting unknown attacks, but it may also generates a huge
amount of false alarms.
When an attacker behaves like a normal user, Heuristic-Based
Detection can be used. This method uses algorithmic logic
to detect intrusion attempts using statistical evaluations of the
trafﬁc.
C. Large-scale coordinated attacks
In this paper, we focus on coordinated attacks, such as
distributed scans, worm outbreaks and distributed denial-of-
service attacks. Such attacks are very difﬁcult to detect,
according to Zhou et al. [7], because IDSs are only monitoring
a limited portion of the network. Zhou et al. refer to large-scale
coordinated attacks as attacks that target a large number of
hosts which are spread over a wide geographical area.
In order to detect these types of large-scale coordinated
attacks, they need the ability to combine the evidence of suspi-
cious network activity from multiple, geographically distributed
networks. To do that, they introduce CIDS, Collaborative
Intrusion Detection System. This type of IDS involves several
IDSs that collaborate through the network, to identify threats.
In this paper, we experiment large-scale coordinated attacks
on NIDS to conﬁrm the need of CIDS. The next section
describes distributed portscan, a coordinated attack used as
a reconnaissance phase.
III. DISTRIBUTED PORTSCAN
We chose to experiment large-scale coordinated attacks using
distributed portscan. Fyodor, original contributor of the audit
tool Nmap, considers in [8] that port scanning lets attackers
discover exploitable communication channels. In this section,
we describe what is a portscan and how to distribute it.
Moreover, we explain why we chose that kind of attacks to
conﬁrm whether or not security systems prevent coordinated
attacks.
A. Portscan
In this section, we deﬁne what is a portscan. Then, we
introduce some variables we used for our experiments and
how an IDS can detect this kind of attack. Eventually, we
describe how an attacker can evade an IDS when portscanning
a network.
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1) Deﬁnition: M. Roesch, who wrote Snort IDS Manual
[9], describes portscan as a ﬁrst phase in network attack, a
reconnaissance phase. In that phase, an attacker determines
what type of network protocols or services a host supports.
Portscan is also used by administrators to evaluate the security
of their networks.
Scanning a port consists in an exchange of network packets ;
depending on the reaction of the remote host, one can conclude
whether or not a port is open, closed or ﬁltered.
2) Variables of a portscan: when an attacker wants to
perform a portscan on a network, he can adjust some variables.
These variables let the attacker be more discrete or know
speciﬁc information about remote scanned hosts.
a) Techniques: depending on the goals of the attacker,
he would use a speciﬁc technique rather than another. Most
of portscan techniques give information about state of the
targeted ports whereas other techniques give information about
the service or the operating system.
These techniques are explained in [8], the manual of Nmap.
For example, TCP Connect scanning consists in establishing a
TCP connection. This is done by exchanging several packets
between the source and the destination. After an attacker has
initiated a TCP connection, he knows whether or not the port
is open, following the answer the remote host gives him.
Another example is the FIN scanning technique. This one use
a weakness of the speciﬁcations of the TCP protocol. Indeed,
the RFC 793 [10] reads : ”If the destination port state is
closed [...] an incoming segment not containing a RST causes
a RST to be sent in response.” As a result, when an attacker
does not receive a response from a remote host after sending
this type of packet, he knows that the port is open.
b) Timing: an attacker can adjust the speed rate of
portscan attacks. By doing this, he can easily evade IDSs,
because most of them do not detect portscans when they are
executed very slowly.
c) Targeted ports: Lee describes different types of tar-
geted port in [11]. Her paper introduces vertical, horizontal
and block scans, presented below.
Vertical scans are portscan that target numerous ports on a
singular remote host. That type of portscan tries to discover
a weakness on a particular host. Contrary to vertical scans,
horizontal scans target only one port on several remote hosts.
This lets an attacker search a speciﬁc weakness on a given
network. Horizontal scans are commonly used by worms, that
are aware of a particular vulnerability. A block scan is a
combination of vertical and horizontal scans ; it consists in a
portscan of several ports on several remote hosts.
d) Parallelization and distribution: another variable of
portscans is the parallelization. An attacker can divide portscans
into sub-tasks that scan only a part of the set. A portscan using
local parallelization has more chance to be detected quickly
by IDSs because only one host generates malicious trafﬁc.
That’s why distributed portscan is a good idea to evade IDS.
Distributed portscans are described in the Section III-B.
3) Portscan detection: one of the features of IDSs is to
detect portscans. This section describes how IDSs succeed to
do this.
Firstly, we have to differenciate portscan that mimic legit
trafﬁc and portscan that use weaknesses of protocols. The latter
is very easy to detect when such weaknesses are described and
known by IDSs. For example, FIN scanning (or the alternative
Null scanning) generates unexpected trafﬁc. An IDS keeping
connection state can detect such malicious trafﬁc. Snort stores
a huge set of signatures, that describes such attacks.
Detecting a portscan that generates legit trafﬁc is very
difﬁcult. IDSs use counters to attribute a score to each host
that tries to address an host of the internal network. These
counters are incremented each time an event occurs. When a
counter reaches a ﬁxed threshold, an alert is raised.
Counters need to be reinitialized or decreased ; Kang et al.
introduce in [12] some amnesty policies. The ﬁrst one, Positive-
Reward-based method, consists in decreasing the counter
whenever the host is acting normally. A normal event could be
a successful connection or a connection to a highly visited host.
The second one, Timeout-based method, decreases counters
when related events expire.
4) IDS evasion: the main goal of an attacker is to be
unnoticed so that he can perform an attack after. To remain
discreet, he has to evade IDSs.
There are several ways to evade IDSs. First, an attacker
has to use portscan techniques that adopt a legit behaviour.
For IDSs using threshold detection technique, an attacker can
avoid Positive-Reward-based method by connecting regularly
to known open ports. To evade Timeout-based method, an
attacker just has to slow down the portscan attack.
Another way to evade IDS is to split the portscan through
several hosts. This is the topic of the next section.
B. Distributed Portscan
The easiest and fastest way to scan while evading IDS is to
distribute attacks. IDSs are most of the time defenseless when
several hosts, also called scanners, are leading an attack.
We chose to experiment distributed portscan because portscan
is a phase where attackers are trying to acquire networks
knowledge. If IDSs can stop them at this phase, following
attacks would not be that efﬁcient. Moreover, distributed
portscan is one of the most common large-scale coordinated
attacks.
This section describes basic methods to distribute an attack
in order to portscan some hosts of a network. We only describe
two distribution techniques because we implemented them for
the experimentations. We suppose, for these experimentations,
that attackers know when hosts achieving attacks are detected.
Actually, this is not true for real attacks. This assumption let
us compute rates introduced in Section V.
1) Naive distribution: Kang et al. describe in [12] the naive
distribution. It consists in a sequential distributed scan: the
attacker selects one of the scanners he controls and starts
scanning the target network with it. When the scanner is
detected, the attacker selects a different scanner and resume the
portscan. The process continues until the portscan is completed.
We expect this type of distributed portscan to be linear: if a
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scanner can scan x ports, two scanners should be capable to
scan the double, 2x.
2) Parallel Distribution: This distribution consists in split-
ting the whole set containing targets and ports between scanners.
Each scanner has a sub-task to perform, then he communicates
the results to a coordinator. We expect this technique to overrule
IDSs detection due to the generated trafﬁc.
IV. EXPERIMENTATIONS
This section presents the experimentations that have been
made to conﬁrm that actual security solutions are not efﬁcient
against large-scale coordinated attacks. First, we introduce the
different tested solutions then we explain how the solutions
were tested.
A. Security solutions
We experimented large-scale coordinated attacks on two
security solutions : Snort and a commercial ﬁrewall. We chose
to experiment these attacks on both a commercial and a non-
commercial solution, in order to compare devices coming from
different environments.
1) Snort: This open-source IDS, according to [9], is able to
analyze network trafﬁc in real-time. Snort (version 2.9.1) uses
a set of signatures (written by the community) that identify
known attacks. In our case, this type of detection (signature-
based) can only target portscans that are known and not legit.
Snort uses also several modules, including sfPortscan that does
statistical analysis and detects portscan that could seem legit.
2) Commercial Firewall: This product is also called a United
Threat Management. According to its speciﬁcations, it includes
a network ﬁrewall and an IDS. As it is a commercialized prod-
uct, we do not know the mechanisms used by the manufacturer
to detect attacks and intrusions. However, experimentations
should give us an idea of how this device works.
B. Experimental protocol
Experimentations have a common process that we present in
this section along with the network architecture and benchmark
conﬁguration.
1) Network architecture: the network architecture used for
experimentations is pictured in Figure 1. The security solution,
at the center, is the gateway between cloud computing hosts
(on the left) and internet hosts (on the right). All trafﬁc goes
through the security solution.
Fig. 1: Network architecture
All hosts (from the cloud or the internet) were virtualized
within OpenVZ2 containers. Snort was also virtualized whereas
the commercial ﬁrewall was a physical device.
2) Benchmark conﬁgurations: experimentations we made
have been accomplished with different conﬁgurations. A
conﬁguration is characterized by several variables, such as
the number of attacking (or targeted) hosts, the way to scan or
the way to distribute the portscan. Below, we list the different
values of these variables :
• number of attacking hosts : 2n, with 1 ≤ n ≤ 6,
• number of targeted hosts (Snort) : 2n, with 1 ≤ n ≤ 6,
• number of targeted hosts (Commercial) : 2n, with n = 2,
• distribution portscan technique : naive and parallel,
• portscan technique : Connect, SYN, RPC, FIN, Null, Xmas,
• local portscan timing : insane, aggressive, normal and
polite,
• targeted ports : 100 ports (most used ports),
• trafﬁc generated : only by the attacks,
• security solution conﬁguration : default.
Timing values are Nmap default options ; for example, insane
timing does a parallelized portscan every 5ms while polite
timing does a sequential portscan every 0.4s. We chose not
to tweak the conﬁguration, so that a security solution is not
favoured over the other one.
3) Benchmark process: Each benchmark was an automated
sequence of steps. These steps include turning on the security
device, processing the distributed attack, verifying whether or
not there is an intrusion according to the security solution,
logging information about the current attack, turning off the
security device.
The reason to turn on and off the device at the beginning
and at the end of experimentations is to avoid interferences
from the previous and next benchmark.
V. RESULTS
A. Evaluation
After each experiment, we knew how many ports the attacker
succeeded to scan. To compare experiments, we introduce
a metric named Attacker Success Rate (ASR), computed as
follows:
n = Number of ports successfully scanned before detection
T = Total number of ports to scan
ASR =
n
T
We consider that a portscan is successful when it is not
detected. Also, the scanner needs to ﬁnd the correct port
state and the generated trafﬁc must reach targets (according to
security policies, ﬁrewalls may drop packets).
This rate, that ﬂuctuates between 0 and 1, can also be
represented as a percentage. The lower is the rate, the better is
the security solution. Indeed, a low rate means that the security
solution has detected almost all portscan attempts.
2OpenVZ is a container-based virtualization for Linux:
http://wiki.openvz.org.
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Each conﬁguration has been executed at least 25 times.
To avoid false-positives (that may be caused by hardware
malfunctioning, network disconnection, etc.), we creamed off
results by removing extreme values. Then, we calculated median
value for each conﬁgurations, that are displayed in the following
tables and diagrams.
B. Results
In this section, we only highlight some particularity of the
results. The whole set of results and scripts used for these
experimentations are available3 on request.
We present results using diagrams. A diagram represents
the ASR on the y-axis (as a percentage) for a given number
of scanners and a given portscan technique. Also, a diagram
pictures distribution techniques (naive to the left, parallel to
the right). The number of scanners is represented with different
colors ; they are grouped together according to the timing of
the portscan.
Figure 2 refers to experiments on Snort for the TCP Connect
technique. We observe that for 32 (Figure 2b) and 64 targets
(Figure 2c), naive distribution is nearly linear. The case where
there is only one target (Figure 2a) is speciﬁc: Snort does
not detect anything because there isn’t enough trafﬁc to raise
alarms.
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Fig. 2: Snort – ASR for the TCP Connect portscan technique
according to number of targeted hosts
Also, we observe that the more scanners there are, the
faster the attack is detected. Indeed, for 32 scanners, for the
polite timing, we have these rates, according to the distribution
technique presented in Table I.
3Address an email to authors or go to the website : www.liﬂ.fr/∼riquetd
Number of targets ASR Naive ASR Parallel
1 100% 100%
8 41% 96%
32 9% 84%
64 5% 84%
TABLE I: Snort – TCP Connect technique with 32 scanners
Besides, we notice that the best way to evade IDS detection
is to use distribution rather than slowing the attack. For
example, for 8 targets and parallel distribution, success rate is
respectively 10% and 37% for insane and polite timing. On
the contrary, when we vary the number of scanners, success
rate is respectively 10% and 95% for 1 and 64 scanners.
Figure 3 presents distributed TCP Connect Portscan targeting
4 hosts. As soon as there are at least 8 scanners, the commercial
ﬁrewall is better. Indeed, Snort is completely overrunned, with
an ASR about nearly 100% for each cases. This is not true
for the polite timing, where the commercial ﬁrewall seems to
reach his limits. Distributed attacks are slow enough to bypass
detection system.
The commercial ﬁrewall has better results when there are
few scanners but becomes inoperative when attacks are slow
enough.
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Fig. 3: ASR for the TCP Connect portscan targeting 4 hosts
Figure 4 presents results for the Null scanning technique,
which use a illegit behaviour. This kind of technique can be
identiﬁed and described as a signature. Surprisingly, default
conﬁguration of Snort does not include this signature. Snort
does not detect Null portscan attacks, whatever the experimental
conﬁguration is.
About the commercial ﬁrewall, the device integrates a TCP
automaton ; this let the device drops any packet that is not
in a right state. In this case, trafﬁc generated by a scanner
never reaches targets, because it does not generate a correct
exchange of data. We encountered similar results with FIN
and Xmas scan techniques (illegit portscan method). In these
cases, portscan (or distributed portscan) is never considered
successful (this implies that ASR is always equal to 0). Indeed,
when a ﬁrewall drops that type of packet, portscan usually
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concludes unsuccessfully port states based on ﬁrewall answers.
Figure 4b and Figure 5b present these results.
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Fig. 4: ASR for the Null portscan targeting 4 hosts
Other scan techniques like Xmas [8] scanning, based on a
illegit behaviour, are included by default in the signature set
of Snort IDS. Snort is very efﬁcient in this case, according to
ﬁgure 5.
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Fig. 5: ASR for the Xmas portscan targeting 4 hosts
To conclude about experimentations, there is always a way
to successfully evade detection systems. In our experiments,
for most conﬁgurations, 32 scanners were enough to evade
them. According to results, large-scale coordinated attacks
easily evade IDS and ﬁrewalls.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cloud computing is a resourceful architecture. It can provide
several layers of services according to the needs. Currently,
only security issues delay its massive adoption. In this paper,
we studied cloud computing security, more precisely the impact
of large-scale coordinated attacks.
Experimentations led in this paper show that distributed
attacks can easily be achieved without being detected. Indeed,
either the security solution can be obsolete because not updated,
or the solution can rely on unsuitable methods. Be that as it
may, an attacker who controls enough hosts can accomplish
distributed attacks while evading security solutions. In our case,
the attacker needs 32 hosts to complete a distributed portscan
to avoid detection.
Our experiments only focus on distributed portscans, so other
experimentations about different distributed attacks should be
led. Also, we point out the fact that no trafﬁc noise was included
during our experimentations, so results might be worse in real
attacks.
Our future work will focus on the detection of large-
scale coordinate attacks using collaborative IDS (CIDS) using
reconﬁgurable devices. These IDS could be scattered across
the network as physical or virtual probes.
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